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Introduction
In July 2016 the European Commission published a Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 1 The Notice is the last piece of the State aid modernization jigsaw and in theory, as with all last pieces, the most crucial one as it aims to clarify key concepts on the definition of what constitutes an aid. The Notice manifesto is that this is a necessary operation in the interest of transparency, consistency, and easy application of the law across the European Union. 2 It is difficult not to agree as these are laudable objectives and certainly the Notice is an impressive document: it should increase legal certainty for businesses and national administrations alike by offering an explanation of Article 107 (1) case law. It also streamlines policy developments in the sector. Notwithstanding the ambitious task the Commission undertook in publishing this Notice, there are in our view certain reservations that are only fair to discuss, once again acknowledging the considerable effort made to clarify an extremely complex area of EU law. Our contentions are mainly two: the first stems from old fashioned debates on hierarchy of sources and legality. Second, that concerns on these fronts might in turn impede the regulatory goals envisaged by the European Commission upon publication of the Notice. In other words, the definition(s) of the notion of aid as made explicit in the Notice ends up being unavoidably partial and thus questionable. This paper will not deal with every specific point raised by the sixty pages of the Notice as this would be an impossible task, but it will look at the Notice through the prism of its legal status and of the evolution of the case law on the notion of aid. It will start by discussing the place of the notion within the hybrid framework of State aid regulation in Europe. It will then clarify several aspects related to the legal nature and legal effects. The criteria for establishing the legality of the Notice on the notion of aid will be briefly discussed before moving to a legal analysis of the text of this instrument.
The place of the Notice within the hybrid State aid regulatory framework
The Notice belongs to a category of legal instruments assimilated to the recommendations and opinions mentioned in Article 288 (4) TFEU, often referred to as 'soft law'. Such instruments are not legally binding according to the Treaty, but may produce practical and even legal effects. 3 Soft law is not new to EU State aid. In fact, regulation in this field has been characterized by hybridity, 4 as binding and non-binding legal instruments have been employed in various combinations by the European institutions in order to achieve a scaling down and a better rationalization of subsidies throughout the European Union. In the first decades, State aid enforcement relied solely on the Treaty articles, with the Commission issuing decisions on a case-by-case basis -an approach perceived as problematic from a transparency point of view. 5 After failing in its attempts to fill this regulatory gap, the Commission resorted to soft law, because of the advantages it represented: its speedy adoption process and its potential to increase flexibility, transparency, and legal certainty of decision making in the state aid field. 6 Communications, notices, guidelines, or frameworks have been issued by the Commission ever since the 1970s and for a long time constituted the main tool for State aid regulation. The soft law approach was formalised by the adoption of Commission (hard law) decisions in individual cases based on the various soft law instruments, 7 or by Court endorsement. 8 Much of the soft law issued in state aid dealt with the application of Article 107(3): aid, which may be declared, at the Commission's discretion, compatible with the internal market. The initial approach to regulation was industry-specific and soft law instruments were issued in various sectors, such as coal and steel, motor vehicles, and fisheries. For the past decade, state aid has been undergoing a process of modernisation, streamlined in the 2005 State Aid Action Plan 9 and subsequently in the 2012 Communication on State Aid Modernisation 10 -both soft law instruments. These initiatives were spurred by the Lisbon and the Europe 2020 agendas, respectively, and lead to the amendment of several guidelines, notices, and frameworks, as well as to the issuing of new ones, such as the Notice on the notion of aid. The approach to regulation is now horizontal, as the support from individual undertakings shifted in recent instruments to objectives of Union interest such as education, research, employment, and regional development.
dealing with state aid, academics and lawyers. 11 A bit more than two years after the end of this first -and only -round of consultations, the final version of the notice was published. While the positions of various organisations are available online, there is no information on whether supplementary negotiations or consultations have been carried out. A majority of Member States intervened, and a number of public and private organisations also replied to the consultations.
Conducting consultations for soft law instruments is fairly standard in competition and State aid. It responds to the need to ensure openness of decision making, as laid down in Article 15 TFEU. Indeed, openness relates not only to access to information but also to the possibility for the different actors to 'monitor and influence legislative and executive processes through access to information and access to decision-making arenas.' 12 While public consultations might inject some legitimacy into the decision making process, as with other soft law instruments, there is no evidence that the European Parliament was involved in the adoption of the Notice on the notion of aid. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to engage in an empirical analysis of how and whether the responses to the consultation were taken into account by the European Commission. We would only want to flag that, in the interest of openness, it might be useful for the Commission to give some details of the way in which they took into account the views expressed by the participants in its consultations. This might alleviate some of the criticisms that soft law is sometimes issued according to procedures that completely lack transparency. 13 
Legal nature and legal effects
As mentioned in the Preamble, the notice aims to foster general principles of law such as clarity, transparency, and consistency. 14 Such a statement is frequently found in soft law instruments issued by the European Commission, underlining the function of notices or communications to create links between the institutions and individuals, natural or legal persons, thus enhancing legal certainty and transparency of administrative activity. Through instruments such as the Notice on the notion of aid, the Commission explains the existing Community law in a specific sector, and it presents its own views on the law and clarifies those provisions of an open and indeterminate character. 15 In this context, Snyder talked about 'regulation by publication' 16 and Hoffman about 'regulation by information'. 17 In principle, the mechanism is as follows: the European commission publishes guidance and regulates without recourse to binding rules. Individuals would adjust their behaviour in accordance to the guidelines issued by the Commission in order to pre-empt potential challenges to their practices. National administrations would also be guided by the communications of the Commission, and hence the different levels of governance and enforcement would be connected, in the European Union, 'not by binding decisions but by transfers of information'. 18 However, in practice, soft law cannot always promote clarity, consistency, and transparency at all levels of governance and enforcement. This is because, in the absence of legally binding force, the effects of such instruments are rather difficult to determine and the enforceability of soft law is problematic.
At the EU level, the Notice on the notion of aid creates legally binding effects for the European Commission (assuming consistency with hard law provisions, an issue we will discuss in the next section). As noted by the European Court of Justice, by publishing soft law, the Commission imposes a limit on the exercise of its discretion and cannot depart from those rules under pain of being found, where appropriate, to be in breach of the general principles of law, such as equal treatment or the protection of legitimate expectations. 19 The Court thus established a direct link between on the one hand the principle of legitimate expectations and equal treatment, and the legal effects of soft law on the other. This line of reasoning was reiterated in an established line of case law, including in the area of state aid; 20 it appears that the objectives of clarity, consistency, and transparency, laid down in the Preamble of the Notice have the potential to be ensured at the EU level.
The effects of the Notice at the national level are less clear, potentially endangering transparency and consistency in the application of State aid rules. Indeed, if it is settled case law that soft law binds the discretion of the enacting institution, the European Courts are more parsimonious when admitting binding effects of soft law instruments for national authorities. For example, in Expedia, a competition law case, the Court held that even though Commission notices are intended to give guidance in the application of Article 101 TFEU, national authorities and courts are not bound to apply such instruments. 21 The Preamble of the Notice on the notion of aid appears to suggest that it needs to be applied by national authorities and Courts 22 when they decide on cases involving Article 107 (1). However, an obligation for national authorities and courts to take the notice into consideration can hardly rely on this paragraph alone. In IJssel-Vliet, the Court had the opportunity to clarify the issue further when asked to interpret the Guidelines on aid in the fisheries sector. The Court considered, first, the Article 108 (1) TFEU obligation of cooperation between the Commission and the Member States in keeping under constant review the systems of aid. It identified the guidelines on fisheries as an element of that obligation. Second, the Court analysed whether the cooperation materialized, and concluded that the Netherlands had agreed to the provisions of the Guidelines following an exchange of letters. Consequently, the guidelines created a framework of cooperation in accordance with Article 108(1) TFEU from which neither the Commission nor the Member States could be released. 25 The same mechanism was reiterated in subsequent state aid cases. 26 It follows that the binding legal effect of State aid soft law for the Member States rests on a 'framework of cooperation' which includes the Member State's acceptance of a particular instrument and the specific obligation of cooperation provided for in Article 108 TFEU. 27 It remains to be seen whether such a framework of cooperation can be developed for the Notice on the notion of aid. The Notice was issued following a process of consultation, and Member States and stakeholders were asked to contribute. However, the case law appears to suggest that more is needed in order to establish that soft law has been accepted by the Member States and could produce legally binding effects for national authorities. For instance, in Spain v Commission the text of the soft law instrument at stake expressly called for the consultation of the Member States with regards to subsequent revisions, and unilateral amendments by the European Commission were judged not binding on national authorities. 28 Such an obligation for consultation is not written down in the text of the Notice on the notion of aid. Furthermore, acceptance might be deduced from the application of the Notice by the Member States -in the case of IJssel-Vliet, the Court established that not only was the Netherlands consulted when the fisheries guidelines were reviewed, but that cooperation with the Commission was maintained in practice throughout the existence of the Guidelines. 29 A sustained practice of compliance, materialized through concrete exchanges between the Commission and the Member State might constitute grounds for the Court to determine that the Notice has been accepted by a Member State and that, as a consequence, it is binding on national authorities.
Soft law can also produce practical effects for the Member States, such as a route to policy change and inducing subtler changes at the level of discourse, understanding and policy principles. Hence, 'formally non-binding agreements can gradually become politically, socially and morally binding for the actors involved.' 30 In the long run, states may integrate, into their national orders, norms and practices established by way of soft law. Such effects have not yet been given judicial recognition. In the case of the Notice on the notion of aid, participation in the public consultations and the satisfaction that a certain view was heard might entice Member States to comply with the notice. Indeed, a sense of obligation might simply be generated by the belief that an instrument was adopted through legitimate processes. 31 However, the consultations or the negotiations for new soft law instruments might be sometimes problematic for certain countries, with smaller Member States feeling 'neglected and ploughed over in this process.' 32 The Commission can also force acceptance of soft law through the threat of opening formal investigations into state aid measures covered by newly adopted soft law. 33 Of course, 'only if a broad majority of Member States agree with its soft law can the Commission credibly threaten individual Member States and force them into a final approval', 34 which brings us back to the obligation through legitimacy point discussed above.
It follows that even if the Notice might not fulfil the IJssel-Vliet criteria in order for the ECJ to acknowledge its legally binding effects, its practical effects might be very important. National administrative authorities might apply the Notice whenever they decide to grant aid to certain companies. Furthermore, national courts might also decide to apply the Notice, given the general recommendation of the ECJ that national judges should 'take soft law into consideration' when judging on cases. 35 However, in the absence of legally binding effects, national authorities and courts can also choose not to take the notice into account. The consistency objective is thus undermined, as variation can easily occur at the national level with some of the Member States feeling bound to apply the Notice, whereas others consider that they are free to disregard it. Clarity and transparency are also negatively impacted, given that the decision of national authorities or courts to rely or not on the Notice will ultimately impact on the legal situation of potential beneficiaries or competitors. Individuals would find it very difficult to challenge the Notice in Court without proving that it is formally binding for national authorities. Such lack of judicial review is potentially dangerous, if one considers the important practical effects that soft law can have. necessary to assess the legality of the Notice on the notion of aid, an issue that brings to the fore a certain constitutional uneasiness.
The 'oddity' of the Notice: a constitutional uneasiness
From a legality perspective, soft law instruments must comply with hard law provisionsstated as early as in the 1980s case law. One of the first times that the Court dealt with the issue was a state aid case, Deufil. The Court held at that time that a state aid code could not derogate from Articles 107 and 108 TFEU. 36 This was reiterated in a number of cases, such as France vs Commission, where a communication was annulled by the Court. 37 The communication was considered ultra vires because it introduced amendments to a directive which could not be done by means of a non-binding legal act. Determining whether soft law is ultra vires -or that it introduces new obligations that go beyond what is written in hard law-is not a straightforward task. Indeed, in the case of vague, general hard law norms, it may 'frequently be impossible to make a clear determination of where the boundaries of the existing obligation begin and end'. 38 Even though a soft law instrument might not seem to introduce new legal obligations, it might promote a very radical interpretation of an obligation provided in a regulation or a directive thus having in practice significant effects on the legal situation of individuals or Member States. Indeed, one can envisage that in the absence of the soft law instrument, the authorities might interpret the specific obligation provided in the hard law provision in a more lenient or more stringent way.
Such general concerns are also relevant for the Notice on the notion of aid, and, in this connection, two specific issues need to be flagged. First, the Notice on the notion of aid is an instrument issued within the ambit of Article 107 (1), whereas so far soft law was mostly confined to interpreting the other paragraphs of Article 107. This approach is significant from a constitutional perspective, specifically with regards to institutional competences. Soft law is generally issued by the Commission in order to explain how it will exercise its discretion. However, as laid down in the case law, the notion of state aid is an objective concept defined by the Treaty, and the competence to interpret this notion belongs solely to the Court of Justice. In contrast with Article 107 (3) TFEU, in the area of Article 107 (1) there is very little discretion for the European Commission to exert or to explain. In fact, the Commission duly acknowledges in the notice that its discretion is limited to technical or complex appraisals, 'in particular in situations involving complex economic assessments.' 39 How far the Notice on the Notion of aid can go depends thus on the tight margin of Commission discretion in the field of Article 107 (1).
Second, the Commission is limited in its interpretation of Article 107 (1) by the case law of the Court, as is also acknowledged by the Preamble to the Notice. Article 107 (1) defines the notion of aid, with the Court of Justice distilling four criteria therefrom: advantage, state resources, selectivity, effect on competition and trade. 40 The criteria have been further interpreted in an important body of case law which defines the boundaries of Article 107 (1), and a notice interpreting the notion of aid needs to remain within these boundaries. In fact, the ECJ has been constantly stating that soft law in general should be subordinated to judicial precedent, and noted that often soft law merely restates what was already established through judicial practice. For example, when assessing whether the guidelines on antitrust fines remained within the limits established by hard law, the Court analysed their conformity with previous case law. Furthermore, the fact that soft law must not contradict precedent is often mentioned by the Courts as an additional safeguard so that what the Commission stated in certain guidelines, notices or communications is in line with EU law. Finally, soft law might be used in order to develop and clarify general requirements laid down in previous case law, but this is only in order to set out tighter limits on administrative discretion. Once imposed, such limits need to be observed and the Commission could not rely in its favour on the more permissive provisions of previous case law or hard law instruments. 41 It follows that the Notice on the notion of aid should mainly codify the case law of the Court. To a certain extent, the Notice is extremely useful in that it brings together in a structured document many principles laid down in the judgments of the ECJ. However, legality becomes problematic and needs further scrutiny especially because many paragraphs of the Notice refer solely to Commission practice. Some of these paragraphs may fall within the narrow administrative discretion in the area of 107 (1) -as fluidly as these limits might be defined. Some others might deal with 'issues that have not yet been considered by the Union Courts', on which the Commission promises in the Preamble to 'set out how the notion of State aid should be construed.' 42 All these are of course matters left ultimately to the appraisal of the European Courts. However, given its limited binding effects, judicial review of the notice is problematic, and one may wonder whether the Court will ever have the opportunity to scrutinize the compatibility of this instrument with its own case law. Furthermore, transparency and legitimate expectations might be diminished with individuals not being able to ascertain whether the paragraphs of the notice referring solely to Commission decisional practice are -or will beendorsed by the ECJ in case of legal action. To conclude, while the Notice must be commended for pooling a vast array of subtleties inherent within the notion of aid, its goal to promote clarity is undermined by the uneasy mix of codified case law, views of the Commission on issues not yet decided by the ECJ, and views of the Commission on aspects pertaining to its limited discretion.
The Notion of Aid as it emerges from the Notice: Some concerns.
To move now to the substance, there are several concerns that the Notice raises. They are in our view classifiable in: agenda setting concerns and playing with the Treaty concerns. It would of course be asking too much from a 'policy entrusted' body such as the European Commission to come up with a sort of an aseptic document, totally immune from any subjective evaluations. This is more so for such a complex area of EU law such as state aid control; an area that has been through endless variations and evolutions throughout its sixty years or so of application. 43 Thus the Commission should be entirely forgiven for the possible temptation to try to settle with the Notice some of the more uncertain aspects in the judicial application of the notion of aid and to indicate solutions for the future. Still, it all depends to what extent and how in depth this sort of agenda setting task is undertaken. 44 This principle encompasses another one, that is to say the irrelevance in the context of the application of Article 107(1) of the kind of regulatory competence exercised by the Member state. In the old and celebrated Italy v Commission, the Court vigorously rejected the argument presented by the Italian Government that as the power to tax was to be reserved to the state, this would have prevented the application of EU law. 45 Thus from the perspective of the nature of the measure, state aid as a notion is 'blind' (whilst state aid as a policy is not, obviously). The Notice seems instead to prefer to highlight some very specific areas. In particular, the Notice contains two very large sections, one devoted to fiscal aid and the other to infrastructure.
We will deal with fiscal aid below, let's concentrate here on Infrastructure. This specific topic is even given an ad hoc section, the number seven, following the six classic ones on the notion of undertaking, state resources, the market operator principle, selectivity and effect on trade and competition (the Introduction is number one!) For a reader not venturing beyond the index, infrastructure looks like one of the constitutive elements of the notion of aid. The more alert reader will learn that the reason for such a prominence of infrastructure is the fact that Member states sought specific guidance on the strategic sector of public funding of infrastructure. 46 This is certainly true and it is even truer that public support for infrastructure is an area of EU state aid control where legal certainty is badly needed. Infrastructure has been traditionally considered as the expression of state functions and thus falling outside the scope of Treaty rules on state aid. The EU Courts, in actually a relatively small number of cases most notably Aéroports de Paris and Leipzig Halle, held instead (and for the first time) that the funding of infrastructure that can be commercially exploited falls within the scope of Article 43 See for an attempt to trace such an evolution A. Biondi 46 Notice on the notion of aid, para 5 and para 200. 107(1). Conversely, in cases whether the infrastructure serves only the exercise of public powers, the measures will not fall foul of state aid rules. 47 The fact that these two judgments somehow reversed a sort of perennial belief that infrastructure was a state aid free-zone, did indeed create some uncertainty especially for all those projects started in a pre Aéroports de Paris era. The Court of Justice itself in Leipzig Halle in rejecting a claim based on a breach of the principle of non-retroactivity hinted to the fact that pre-Aéroports de Paris funding for infrastructure could be legitimately considered as measures of general economic policy and thus not a violation Article 107 (1). 48 In the Notice of aid, the Commission takes such a hint to its extreme consequences by fixing a precise cutoff time. 49 You can already spot here some lucrative litigation going to Luxembourg, especially as the ECJ case law on the matter is far from being settled, with publicly run airports being allowed recently a certain margin of discretion to fix their own charges and fees. In Lubeck, 50 for instance, the Commission lost a case challenging airport pricing policies as the Court of Justice rejected the argument that selectivity could be presumed for measures laying down the conditions on which a public undertaking offers its own goods or services. Following a narrow reading of the reference framework within the Adria Wien selectivity test, such measures were considered by the Court to fall outside the ambit of Article 107 TFEU.
Further, the Notice continues with a comprehensive analysis of several types of infrastructure from airport, to ports, to broadband. All the 'principles' regulating these activities are supported with a mere reference to the Commission decisional practice and do not refer to any case law, raising once again the concerns discussed above. The choice to include an ad hoc section on infrastructure is even more questionable as the Commission experience in some of these specific areas is still relatively limited. Evidence of the ongoing evolution in this area is the fact that the Commission itself only a few months ago has already approved an amendment of the GBER, which includes -inter alia-new rules on regional airports and ports. 51 As the discussion is still ongoing on some key areas both in the case law of the ECJ and the administrative practice of the Commission, it could be argued that it was neither necessary nor desirable to 'codify' something that it has not been codified yet.
Effect on Trade/Distortion of Competition-some ambiguities.
More worryingly -from a constitutional point of view-is the temptation to use the Notice to settle questions directly related to the wording of the Treaty -the holy domain of the ECJ. Such a temptation is succumbed to, in our view, most evidently in the section devoted to the 'explanation' of the so-called negative conditions laid down by the Treaty: effect on competition and on trade. It is to be preliminarily acknowledged that the Commission finds itself between a rock and a hard place. As for the rock, the case law of the Court on weather a measure can be classified as having a distortive effect and an impact on trade is, as it is well known, particularly generous: so far as the effect on competition is concerned, it is sufficient to prove that when financial aid is granted by a state this strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-EU trade. 52 With regard to the effect on trade, the Court acquis is consistent in refusing to apply any threshold or percentage below which it may be considered that trade between Member States is not affected. 53 As for the hard place, the Commission for many years has been fiercely criticised for devoting time, money and resources to investigate measures that had very limited impact on competition and trade. In state aid circles, there is a sort of mythological Commission decision on funding to build a swimming pool in the Netherlands that has become a totem of everything that goes wrong in DG Competition despite the fact that actually in that decision, the Commission did not qualify the measure as aid. 54 The Commission has -this time it is truebeen reprimanded by the EU judicature for failing to provide some solid reasons for the application of the two conditions. Thus in Wam the Court annulled a Commission decision as in the case at stake the effect on intra-Community trade and competition was 'less immediate and even less discernible.' 55 More recently the Commission suffered the indignity of being sanctioned for breaching Article 41 the Charter of Fundamental Rights for the failure to provide adequate reasons on why a certain national fiscal measure was distortive on competition and why it had an impact on trade. 56 Thus, not an easy conundrum for the Commission. However, the way in which the Commission is attempting to solve it, is by 'creating' what is basically a new test specifically for the effect on trade condition. On the basis of its own practice, the Commission states that, as far as the effect on trade is concerned, Article 107(1) will not be triggered when the measure has a purely local impact. In these cases, the Commission needs to ascertain that the beneficiary supplied goods or services to a limited area within a Member State and was unlikely to attract customers from other Member States, and that it could not be foreseen that the measure would have more than a marginal effect on the conditions of cross-border investments or establishment. 57 It seems that two conditions are now necessary to comply with the effect on trade criteria: some kind of physical or economic cross border 'attraction' and the possibility On the contrary, most recently in the Eventech case, dealing with whether the use of bus lanes reserved for black cabs only could have an effect on trade, the Court restated that it is never necessary that the beneficiary undertakings are themselves involved in intra-Community trade and that there is no threshold or percentage below which it may be considered that trade between Member States is not affected. 58 In our view, the Commission's aim is laudable as times might be ripe to 'refine' the case law, but such a task should have been undertaken by relying on the pathway indicated by the Court itself. As a matter of fact, the case law is less monolithic than it looks, as the Court tends to stress the 'likelihood' of a possible impact on trade. Thus in Eventech the Court emphasized for instance that, despite the small amount of aid and the circumstance that black cabs were per se extremely small undertakings, it was rather likely that the fact that other companies could not use the bus lane would make what was potentially big business-taxi services in London -less attractive. The Court so concludes 'it is conceivable that the practice of permitting Black Cabs to use bus lanes on public roads during the hours when the traffic restrictions relating to those lanes are operational, while prohibiting minicabs from using those lanes, except in order to pick up or set down passengers who have pre-booked such vehicles, may be such as to affect trade between Member States within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU'. 59 A contrario where such an effect is not even conceivable, Article 107(1) should not be applied. 60 It is not infrequent even in the context of free movement law, cases where the Court excluded the application of the Treaty on the basis of the unlikelihood of effects on trade. 61 It would have been thus preferable for the Commission to cast its Notice within a Court case law framework. As we tried to suggest, 62 it should have been restated that there is a specific duty for the Commission to provide reasons and such a duty should be discharged, by analogy with recent case law on free movement, by providing 'conclusive evidence' 63 which could include reliable estimates, figures and even patterns of trade, 64 tools not too difficult to use in a state aid context.
Fiscal aid: too much of a look to the future
The Notice, as mentioned above, contains a very large section devoted to fiscal aid. Not since the Code of Conduct on Business, 65 has the Commission managed to pioneer such an extensive set of rules on one of the most explosive, both in political and economic terms, areas of state aid law: taxation. The sub-section on fiscal aid is actually inserted within the part devoted to selectivity so we are firmly within Article 107(1). Again, the decision to 'codify' rules on fiscal aid is a bold one but at the same time questionable. One example will suffice: the most important Commission fiscal aid decisions at the moment are those on national tax rulings. In a series of recent investigations dealing with Starbucks, Fiat and Amazon, the Commission found that national individual tax rulings involve State aid as they provided selective advantages to a specific company or group of companies as they influenced the allocation of taxable profit between subsidiaries of a group located in different countries. Calculations used to set the tax base allegedly rely on a remuneration of a subsidiary or a branch and not on market terms therefore providing a more favourable treatment of the company compared to the treatment other taxpayers. 66 In the case involving Ireland and Apple, the Commission has already ordered the recovery of allegedly unpaid taxes. 67 Crucially, the Notice defines tax rulings as a selective advantage where a tax ruling endorses a result that does not reflect in a reliable manner what would result from a normal application of the ordinary tax system. 68 The Commission identifies compliance in the at arm's length principle as the benchmark against which the 'normal application of the ordinary tax system' should be tested. If a tax ruling endorses such a methodology this would imply that a company is not treated favourably under the ordinary rules of corporate taxation of profits in the Member State concerned 'as compared to standalone companies who are taxed on their accounting profit, which reflects prices determined on the market negotiated at arm's length. 69 The arm's length principle is based on current OECD international guidelines and in a nutshell it means that a transfer price should be the same as if the two companies involved were indeed two independents, not part of the same corporate structure.
The Notice deals extensively with this question and it lays down specific principles that are however still to be tested, and whether one agrees or disagrees with the Commission's analysis, 70 there is hardly a mention of a Court's case. The footnotes provided are actually references to the Fiat, Starbucks and Belgium Excesses tax ruling Decisions which is a bit tautological. The only judgment of the Court of Justice referred to is the Forum 187 case. 71 In that case the relevant Belgian rules reduced artificially the taxable base by excluding without justification certain expenses. The Court, quite logically, strikes it down as the national measure in question had the clear effect of reducing that tax basis with a fiscal 'trick'. We reread the Forum 187 judgment carefully and the OECD principle is mentioned once, not in exactly the same terms advanced by the Commission in its Notice, and it is definitely not used by the Court as a general principle. 72 
A Selective reading of selectivity
Another set of concerns deals with those parts of the Notice that seem to attribute to the case law of the Court a meaning and a clarity that it might not necessarily have. Once again, it is understandable for the Commission to try to 'rationalize' the abundant quantity of case law on state aid, but while on one hand this might be an arduous task as -with all due respect -not every single judgment of the Court is crystal clear and on the other, it is tempting to ascribe to the Court findings that might not necessarily be there. Once again, because of the impossibility of examining every single paragraph of the Notice we will limit ourselves to one example -selectivity. 73 The Notice rightly divides selectivity into 'regional' and 'material'. The latter is subdivided in de jure when it 'results directly from the legal criteria for granting a measure that is formally reserved for certain undertakings only' and de facto. This category of selectivity 'can be established in cases where, although the formal criteria for the application of the measure are formulated in general and objective terms, the structure of the measure is such that its effects significantly favour a particular group of undertakings. 74 The Commission decisional practice on the de facto selectivity has proven to be rather controversial. The 'state aid litigation' of the year is exactly on this point: in 2015 the Commission concluded an investigation into a Spanish measure that allowed the tax amortization of the financial goodwill granted to Spanish companies that acquired some participation in undertakings established in another Member state. Such a tax break was not granted to acquisition within Spain. The Commission considered the measure to be selective on the ground that the amortization of goodwill was per se a divergence from the general tax system. The General Court annulled the Commission decision and put forward what has to be considered a true new test of selectivity. The Court held that the mere existence of a derogation from or an exception to a tax regime does not, by itself, establish that a measure favours 'certain undertakings or the production of certain goods' for the purposes of EU law, since that measure was available, a priori, to any undertaking. The Court also emphasised that a national tax regime that is not aimed at any particular category of undertakings or the 73 The interpretation of such a criteria created several problems for the ECJ itself. See in general P Prek and T Lefevre, "The requirement of selectivity in the recent case law of the court", 2 European State Aid Law Quarterly (2012), 335. 74 Notice on the notion of aid, para. 121 production of goods, but a category of economic transactions cannot be considered selective. Thus despite being a derogation, such a derogation can be so broad as to exclude its selectivity. 75 The ECJ, on appeal, reversed the decision of the General Court and found the tax measure selective and thus considered it as a state aid. In a rather robust passage it held that 'a condition for the application or the receipt of tax aid may be grounds for a finding that that aid is selective, if that condition leads to a distinction being made between undertakings despite the fact that they are, in the light of the objective pursued by the tax system concerned, in a comparable factual and legal situation, and if, therefore, it represents discrimination against undertakings which are excluded from it 76 'The contrast between the two EU courts could not have been more strident and it seems very unlikely that the Financial Goodwill saga will be the last word on fiscal aid. 77 As for the tax rulings decisions, regardless of the side one is taking in support of a narrower reading of selectivity or in support of the Commission's position, the Notice seems to us already in need of constant updating.
Conclusions
The main legal effect of the notice is that it binds the discretion of the European Commission. The fact that the Notice is a document streamlining administrative discretion at the supranational level raises two important sets of concerns. First, the effects of the Notice at the national level are far from clear, given that not all the Member States have participated in or negotiated this document. According to the case law of the EU Courts, an instrument such as the Notice on the notion of aid cannot be legally binding on national authorities and courts; 78 however, in practice, these authorities might decide to apply it when deciding on cases. Individuals are left in a situation of legal uncertainty; given that they might expect the Notice to be applied by the Commission but they do not have the guarantee that their national authorities will also take it into consideration. Judicial review of this instrument might be jeopardized, 79 as its practical effects are unlikely to be recognized in a court of law. Second, given the very limited margin of discretion that the Commission has in the area of Article 107 (1) TFEU, -one may wonder whether it has the competence to adopt the Notice in its current form. This might fuel concerns that the procedures leading to the adoption of soft law lack the legitimacy safeguards provided for by the Treaty for hard law, with academics and institutional actors warning that the European Commission might attempt to legislate through the back door. 80 Legality is thus at stake, especially if, unfettered by judicial control, the Commission could introduce through a Notice new rules, adding to those written down in Article 107 (1) of the Treaty. Third, because of the constant evolution of the case law the Notice will be by definition an ongoing project a bit like a Wikipedia page that needs to be updated incessantly.
The Modernization of state aid plan contains some amazing achievements and in our view reflects the evolutions of the market and the social and economic concerns of these difficult years. The Notice was the very last measure to be approved. One might wonder whether the Commission should have stopped short of taking such a definitive step, but as it had taken it, it is important that all interested parties -including the Commission -should exercise a certain degree of responsibility and carefulness. Albeit a great hitchhiker's guide to State aid law, the Notice cannot replace reading (the sometimes very long) State aid judgments. As far as ultimate questions are concerned, following deep thought, the Court will have an answer.
